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To explain this market mechanism, let PX stand for 
forward and spot markets, which evolve in response to the 
requirements of participants. This will allow bilateral 
contracts for electricity to be struck over timescales 
ranging from long term to on-the-day markets. The PX 
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The objective of generation companies’ gaming strategy is 
to set up a collusion agreement among some main 
generators, at which these particular players keep 
withholding power output volumes during some specific 
periods, i.e. a number of weeks in the winter or summer, 
hence lead the whole marketplace to an oligopoly 
situation and drive up the market prices.   
There are some uncertainties involved with this 
strategy that need be addressed by the agreement 
members, i.e, 
(1) As NETA consists of two separate markets, i.e. PX 
and BM, how do they arrange output volumes 
between them to make the most profits on this 
strategy? 
(2) For each generator, what should the optimal 
withheld output capacity and selling prices be? 
(3) How do they keep coalition generators loyally to 
carry out the agreement? 
(4) Is it likely that there exists equilibrium that 
collusive generators can make best profits 
meanwhile the markets trading can be kept in 
balance, i.e., does not collapse? 
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Once NETA market is successfully modelled, the model 
confirms that generators have an incentive to withhold 
capacity from the market. The model also reveals that 
there are two types of gaming generators. The first is the 
classical “tacit collusion” that occurs in static repeated 
withholding output capacity, where the object is for all 
players to learn that they can always make excess profits 
if they withhold amount of capacity from the market. This 
kind is referred to “loyal co-operators”, suggesting that 
these generators should “always” withhold a portion in 
anticipation of an agreement.  
The second type asserts, however, that it is not always 
profitable to withhold capacity from the market, since the 
opportunity for raising profits does not always exist due to 
internalities and externalities, such as collaborative 
generators breaking the agreement, the demand bid, 
imbalance prices, etc. We refer this phenomenon to 
“opportunistic tacit collusion” to distinguish it from the 
classical “tacit collusion”. These generators follow an 
“opportunistic collusion” strategy whereby generators 
withhold capacity from the market only when they 
perceive an “opportunity” to raise profits by doing so 
exists. Opportunistic collusion might result in a generator 
setting aside a portion of their capacity and deciding for 
each trading round whether or not to offer that capacity to 
the market depending on expectations of raising profits. 
Once this is learned suppliers “tacitly collude” to sustain 
high market prices.  
For the “opportunistic collusive” generators, it is 
difficult to judge an “opportunity” to get more profits by 
estimating possible profit with cooperative strategy. 
Because in a certain market environment where a wide 
number of market participants are trading interactively, 
there are uncertainties and it is unlikely to precisely 
predict all participants’ future moves and trading 
consequence. Nevertheless, the market clearing price in 
PX, PXP, and individual generators’ capacity used in both 
of PX and BM, are introduced as the reference for the 
“opportunistic collusive” generators to decide whether or 
not to join the coalition agreement and withhold capacity 
from the market. 
 
4.1 Small-Scale Model Simulation 
In order to gain a better view of the effects of gaming 
trading strategies on NETA, the first application 
experiment is carried out based on a small scale model. 
The total available generation capacity is assumed as 
33.3GW in this experiment. The number of generators, m, 
is assumed to 5, and suppliers’, n, is assumed to 4 in this 
experiment. The total demand is set as 25 GW, therefore 
the individual maximal demand Qdmaxi, of each supplier is 
set as 6250MW. These experiments are based on the 
standard daily demand profile in November 2004, 
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Figure 4: Standard daily demand profile in November [15] 
 
The generation system self-parameter of this model is 
demonstrated in Table 2: 
Table 2  Generators’ system self-parameters 
 
The wholesale market clearing price PXP, imbalanced 
settlement prices System Buy Price SBP and System Sell 
Price SSP are major model outputs to assess the 
performance of market players’ different strategies. They 
are presented and evaluated as following figures. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the mean daily Power 













Figure 5: Mean daily market clearing price in PX 
 
Figure 6 demonstrates the mean daily price curves of the 
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Figure 6: Mean daily System Imbalance Price 
 
4.2 Large-Scale Model Simulation 
In order to compare the effects of market player strategies 
under different market circumstance, the second 
application experiment is taken on a large-scale model 
which is comparably similar to the NETA market. The 
total available capacity is set same as the experimental 
model at which the non-cooperative strategy is employed. 
The number of generators, m, is assumed to 15, and 
suppliers’, n, is assumed to 10 in this experiment as well. 
The generators of the same type are assumed to have 
similar marginal costs and generation capacity. The 








, of each generator on each generation type 
are presented in Table 3 below. The total available 
generation capacity is set as 66.7GW. Oppositely, the 
maximal market demand is 50GW, which is same as the 
market scale of the NETA, so that the average maximal 
demand Qdmaxi, of each supplier is 1125MW. The ratio of 
maximal market demand to total available generation 
capacity is set as 0.75, following the real situation in 
NETA. The large-scale experiments are based on the same 
winter daily demand profile introduced in the previous 
experiment. The generation system self-parameters show 
as Table 3: 
Table 3  Generators’ system self-parameters 
 
The model major outputs market clearing price PXP, 
imbalanced settlement prices System Buy Price SBP and 
System Sell Price SSP are presented and evaluated as 
following figures. 
Figure 7 shows the mean daily market clearing price 













Figure 7: Mean daily market clearing price in PX 
 




















A set of tests are carried out in developing different 
gaming strategies using the model. The estimates used are 
consistent with those used in published studies on the 
U.K. electricity market, i.e. actual demand profiles, 
generation and supply parameters. There are sorts of 
power generation concerned in this model. After the 
computing is finished, output sets are evaluated to find out 
the market states and consequence of which strategic 































  Oil 
  Marginal 
generation  
      cost 
(£/MWH) 
   24.50        9.72  33.23    66.95  87.91
  Maximal 
generation 
      capacity 
(MW) 
    4450        4450  4450    4450  4450 
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On the second set generators are divided into two groups: 
some adopt competitive strategy with never joining 
coalition agreement; the others are gaming players.   
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[12] H. S. Bierman, et al, Game theory with economic 
applications (New York: Addison-Wesley, Inc., 1998).?
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